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The popularity of books that confront Kant and Hegel to each other is on the rise. At least 
five such books have been published since 1983. They are not tailored any more according 
to the Kronerian (and Hegelian) model which asserts a development of thought "straight 
from Kant to Hegel." Rather, they question whether the alternative 'Kant or Hegel' is 
relevant for the analysis of problems in the context of both thinkers. They try to consider as 
many aspects as possible in answering this question, and tend mostly to abstain from a 
definite decision in this issue. In other respects, however, the books are quite different from 
another, and in at least one respect, they mutually complement each other. 
The book edited by Stephen Priest that is to be discussed here, is characterized by 
five features of its program: 
By deciding certain issues, which are selected with respect to "perennial 
problems of Western philosophy", it is intended that the relative strengths of Kant 
and Hegel be evaluated (preface). 
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Another goal is to examine objectively whose position concerning specific 
issues is supported by better arguments (1). Furthermore, it is to be examined 
whether Hegel presents Kant and the strategy of Kant's argumentation adequately 
(e.g. 69f.). 
The issues discussed here are supposed to cover most of the things in which 
both Kant and Hegel were interested (preface). The development of the Hegelian 
and/or Kantian position to those issues will largely be ignored. 
The discussion of Hegel's critique of Kant rests primarily on the main sources 
of our knowledge about Hegel's discussion of Kant: the Kant-passages in "Faith 
and Knowledge", in the "Lesser Logic" (#40 - 60), and in the "Lectures on the 
History of Philosophy." In his "Introduction", the editor gives a careful exposition 
of the contents of these passages. 
The succession of the articles in this book parallels the succession of topics in 
Kant's three critiques; internally, the articles conform to this order as well. 
Corresponding to these features, the book begins with a treatise on space and time in 
Kant and Hegel (by Michael Inwood). It is the only article on a topic that belongs, in 
Hegel's opinion (but not, however, in Kant's), to philosophy of nature. Hence, this topic 
is primarily discussed from an epistemological point of view. The not very surprising 
result is that, all in all, there is more to be said in favor of Kant 's than of Hegel 's 
position, though Hegel 's positions and arguments must be regarded as not yet fully 
comprehended. Five treatises on topics whose discussions deal with Hegel's comment on 
the Critique of Pure Reason fol low: "Hegel ' s Account of Kant ' s Epis temology" 
(Graham Bird), "Categories and Things-in-Themselves" (Justus Hartnack), "Kantian 
Antimony and Hegelian Dialectic" (John Llewellyn), "Subjectivity and Objectivity" 
(Stephen Priest), and "The Idea of a Critique of Pure Reason" in the view of Kant and of 
Hegel (W.H. Walsh). Together with the last contribution (also by Professor Walsh), 
which discusses Hegel ' s judgment on Kant 's philosophy in general, these articles 
consti tute nearly two thirds of the text (without introduction and bibliography). 
Therefore, relatively little space remains for those papers that focus on topics in the other 
works by Kant, and on Hegel's discussion of these topics. The papers deal with Hegel's 
critique on Kant 's moral and political philosophy (T. O'Hagan), with aesthetics as 
regards Kant and Hegel (Patrick Gardiner), with teleology (David Lamb), with history 
f rom a philosophical perspective (Leon Pompa), and with politics and philosophy 
(Howard Williams). With the exception of the very interesting analyses by T. O'Hagan 
and Leon Pompa, the papers appear to be of lesser relevance in the investigation of 
reasons for or against Kant 's or Hegel 's conceptualizations and assertions than the 
papers in the epistemological group of topics. 
Regrettably, both Kant's theory of the aesthetic assessment of the sublime (which is 
important for the development of Hegel 's thought) and the Philosophy of Religion 
(touched upon in the "Introduction" only) fall victim to space restrictions (even though 
in comparison to other themes, the Philosophy of Religion contains particularly 
numerous references to Kant). But fortunately, the subjects that are addressed as topics 
in the book are discussed on a high level of sophistication. Therefore, many items that 
require further discussion can be determined quite precisely. 
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More important than the question of which authors hit the target and which of them, 
in my opinion, missed the point, are the tasks of clarifying what one can expect from this 
book concerning its goals and their execution, and of clarifying what problems in 
Hegel's critique on Kant are not addressed. The book has its strengths in discussing 
those particular issues that Hegel himself emphasized within his presentations of Kant, 
that Hegel had a distinctly anti-Kantian position to, and that fit into the store of 
recognized topics of Western philosophy. For example, to the issues belongs the question 
of whether a convincing epistemology is possible if cognition is to be understood as 
instrument (71, 81ff. , 122, 130f.) and if the existence of unknowable things in 
themselves is assumed (67, 77, 81-86, 110, 121-24, 132f.). Another example is the 
question of whether the antinomy of reason, evoked by its cosmological "use", points to 
the direction of a Hegelian dialectics (88f.). Furthermore, the question of what the object 
of philosophical knowledge is belongs to these issues, as well as the converse question, 
what philosophical knowledge lastly is in itself. 
Even if answers to the last two questions are possible in the context of Kantian and 
Hegelian philosophy, one must not expect that the goal of this volume requires it to give 
such answers. This is because Hegel, in the context of his presentation of Kant, did not 
clarify what needs to be said about these questions. Although Hegel's critique on Kant 
(and occasionally his presentation of Kant, too) is guided by the intention of attempting 
to answer these questions, perhaps the frame of his Kant-presentation itself did not 
permit him to succeed. Therefore, the accurate observation that Hegel passes over Kant's 
argumentative strategy (in his characterization of Kantian thoughts preceding his 
polemics—e.g. in the discussion of the transcendental apperception, or of the formality 
of the categorical imperative) has not established much. Furthermore, it needs to be 
examined whether there are reasons in the context of Hegel's thoughts concerning reason 
and rationality that successfully defend his cause, although they do not vindicate Hegel's 
violations of the rules governing a careful interpretation of Kant. The considerations 
required by this examination demand first, the confrontation of the Kantian and Hegelian 
designs of philosophical disciplines with each other, and second, the assessment of these 
designs (as elements of competing programs of a system of reason) in respect to their 
chances to be realized. However, the assessment of these designs by judging few 
particular issues is not possible in either Kant or Hegel, in particular, when the issues are 
restricted to recognized topics. For the Kantian and Hegelian designs transcend the limits 
of some particular isolated problems and have never found broad recognition in Western 
philosophy. Moreover, they remained so obscure that their recognition would have little 
value. (For example, who—after two hundred years of Kant scholarship and Kant 
reception—can tell us, what Kant means by rational knowledge out of concepts? Yet, 
Kant means his notion of philosophy to be defined by this expression! I think, as long as 
we are unable to say what Hegel tried to make of this Kantian notion of philosophy, and 
what reasons he employed in doing so, we will not really comprehend Hegel's critique of 
Kant.) The applause deserved by the book discussed here ought not seduce us into the 
misconception that it be superfluous to attack the task alluded to here. 
The book has some editorial idiosyncracies that a reviewer does not want to leave 
unmentioned. It contains only as yet unpublished contributions, apart from the two 
valuable treatises of the late Professor Walsh. Less praiseworthy are the circumstances 
that faultless phrases among the numerous German quotations in the book are apparently 
a matter of luck, and that in general no great care was taken in eliminating typographical 
errors. From a continental point of view, the bibliographical information leaves 
121 
something to be desired in several respects. For example, the list of editions of Hegel's 
works, indicated with abbreviations and mentioned in the notes, neglects the only 
historical-critical edition of Hegel 's works (Gesammelte Werke, ed. im Auftrag der 
Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, Hamburg 1968ff.) which has already grown to a 
significant number of volumes. It also ignores the edition of Hegel's lectures on the 
history of philosophy, which P. Gamier and W. Jaeschke made of the notes written down 
from Hegel's lecture Winter semester 1825/26. (Part 4 has the title: Philosophic des 
Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit. Hamburg 1986). Among the references to secondary 
literature, one does not find the thematically related volume with lectures of the Stuttgart 
Hegel-Convention 1981 (Kant oder Hegel? Ueber Formen der Begruendung in der 
Philosophie, ed. D. Henrich. Stuttgart 1983), one also does not find a monograph by 
Andre Stanguennec (Hegel, critique de Kant. Paris 1985), which the title reveals as a 
French one-author counterpart to Priest's collection. 
